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Background: In 2006, the Parliament of Burkina Faso passed a policy to reduce the direct costs of obstetric services
and neonatal care in the country’s health centres, aiming to lower the country’s high national maternal mortality
and morbidity rates. Implementation was via a “partial exemption” covering 80% of the costs. In 2008 the German
NGO HELP launched a pilot project in two health districts to eliminate the remaining 20% of user fees. Regardless
of any exemptions, women giving birth in Burkina Faso’s health centres face additional expenses that often
represent an additional barrier to accessing health services. We compared the total cost of giving birth in health
centres offering partial exemption versus those with full exemption to assess the impact on additional
out-of-pocket fees.
Methods: A case–control study was performed to compare medical expenses. Case subjects were women who
gave birth in 12 health centres located in the Dori and Sebba districts, where HELP provided full fee exemption for
obstetric services and neonatal care. Controls were from six health centres in the neighbouring Djibo district where
a partial fee exemption was in place. A random sample of approximately 50 women per health centre was selected
for a total of 870 women.
Results: There was an implementation gap regarding the full exemption for obstetric services and neonatal care.
Only 1.1% of the sample from Sebba but 17.5% of the group from Dori had excessive spending on birth related
costs, indicating that women who delivered in Sebba were much less exposed to excessive medical expenses than
women from Dori. Additional out-of-pocket fees in the full exemption health districts took into account household
ability to pay, with poorer women generally paying less.
Conclusions: We found that the elimination of fees for facility-based births benefits especially the poorest
households. The existence of excessive spending related to direct costs of giving birth is of concern, making it
urgent for the government to remove all direct fees for obstetric and neonatal care. However, the policy of
completely abolishing user fees is insufficient; the implementation process must have a thorough monitoring
system to reduce implementation gaps.Background
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nium Development Goal 5 (MDG5), African countries
introduced different approaches to reduce barriers that
limit women’s access to primary health services [1]. Out-* Correspondence: valery.ridde@umontreal.ca
2Centre de recherche du Centre Hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal,
Montréal, Québec (CRCHUM), Canada
3Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, Université de Montréal,
Montréal, Québec, Canada
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2012 Ben Ameur et al.; licensee BioMed Cen
Creative Commons Attribution License (http:/
distribution, and reproduction in any mediumof-pocket fees are one of these barriers. They constitute
a financial burden, usually associated with catastrophic
expenditures that either push already vulnerable house-
holds into poverty or worsen their poverty situation [2].
In the early 1980s, many African countries adopted
structural adjustment policies that led to the introduc-
tion of user fees in the health sector. This required users
to pay for delivery-related health services received.
The situation has evolved since then, and today there
is a growing shift, globally and particularly in Africa, to
reduce financial barriers to health care. There is now atral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
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barrier to rational service use. They also increase the in-
equity gap amongst different socio-economic groups in
terms of access to primary health care [3]. Due to the
adverse effects of user fees on access to basic services,
many organizations and governments advocate the re-
moval of these fees. The focus has been on exempting
specific services and targeting the most vulnerable [4-6].
Our study will cover a rural region in Burkina Faso, a
West African country with high levels of maternal mor-
tality (560/ 100 000 live births; range: 300–950) [7] and
widespread poverty (46.4% population living below the
poverty line) [8].
Government interventions
The Government of Burkina Faso is committed to im-
proving access to maternal care. To reduce the maternal
mortality and morbidity levels, the government decided
in 2006 to subsidize the direct costs of obstetric care
(OC) and neonatal services at 80% of the total cost. This
would reduce financial barriers and encourage women
to make greater use of these services. Beneficiaries pay
the remaining 20% of the medical costs at primary
health centres (CSPS). Where a normal institutional
birth costs 4500 F CFA (≈ 9 US$), the government pays
3600 F CFA (≈7 US$) while the birth mother pays the
remaining 20%, or 900 F CFA (≈ 2 US$). The govern-
ment exemption applies to the total cost of the medical
procedures, drugs and consumables, and observation. In
addition, the government policy includes the costs for
any needed referral by public ambulance to a district or
regional hospital in case of a complication. Since 2004,
traditional birth attendants have been encouraged to
promote medically assisted births rather than assisting
in home births [9].
NGO complementary interventions
In 2008, a German NGO (HELP) funded by the Euro-
pean Commission of Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
began work in Burkina Faso to improve access to quality
health care for pregnant women. A HELP pilot project
covers two rural districts of Sebba and Dori in the
northeastern part of Burkina Faso, and offers a full ex-
emption by covering the 20% of costs not covered by the
government. The main activities of the NGO are the fol-
lowing: 1) subsidize health care for pregnant women 2)
control the exemption system in the pilot districts 3) im-
prove, monitor, and supervise quality of care to pregnant
women. Every month, HELP reimburses each CSPS as
per their report of real expenditures related to maternal
services. Through this intervention, HELP provides
added financial protection to households living in the
pilot districts by reducing the costs related to an institu-
tional birth.There are few studies in West Africa examining the
effects of user fee exemption policies on the reduction of
birth-related expenses and financial protection of house-
holds. Thus, the objective of this paper is to investigate
the impact of these interventions on the out-of-pocket
expenditures of households for non-complicated institu-
tional births in three rural health districts of Burkina
Faso. To compare the excessive medical expenses of
households receiving the partial exemption (controls)
with those receiving the full exemption (cases), we car-
ried out a case–control study in the districts where the
NGO-sponsored pilot project resulted in a full exemp-
tion from user fees and in a neighbouring district where
the government’s partial exemption applied. The findings
from this study will allow different health system stake-
holders to compare costs and benefits of abolishing user
fees versus the current policy of partially subsidizing the
costs of institutional births. The ultimate objective of the
NGO intervention is to scale it up to the national level
through a policy in line with the principle of universal
access to primary health care in order to benefit the
population accessing health care services. [10]. Thus,
stakeholders will need to find strategies to improve suc-
cessful implementation of exemption models.
Methods
Study site
In this study, researchers are analysing the results of a
natural experiment. A natural experiment is an empirical
study in which the experimental conditions are deter-
mined by nature or by other factors out of the control of
the evaluators [11]. The study took place in the Sahel
Region of Burkina Faso about 300 km from the capital
Ouagadougou, which has specific geographical and cul-
tural characteristics. This region has four districts: Dori,
Sebba, Djibo and Gorom-Gorom. The first two represent
the only districts where the NGO intervened during the
study; the evaluators had no control in selecting these
districts for the pilot project. In order to select a third
district for comparison with Dori and Sebba we exam-
ined the level of facility-based delivery (expressed as a
percentage of all institutional deliveries) in Gorom-
Gorom and Djibo. According to Annuaire statistique
2009 (Ministère de la santé - Secrétariat général, Direc-
tion générale de l’information et des statistiques sani-
taires), 22% of institutional deliveries in Gorom-Gorom
had skilled care, while this proportion was 52.4% in
Djibo. Djibo was chosen as the comparison district be-
cause its percentage of skilled care was much closer to
the proportions observed in the Dori and Sebba districts.
Dori and Sebba served as the case districts with a full
user fee exemption provided by a pilot project of the
NGO HELP, and Djibo as the control district with the
government-mandated partial user fee exemption. The
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three districts (Table 1).
Health centre selection and population sampling
In every district, six health centres were selected for a
total of 18 health centres (30% of the total centres). This
selection sample was based on two previous studies in
the region that reflected situational diversity [12] [13].
Only two exceptions were made because of access con-
straints due to the rainy season at the time of data col-
lection. For these two cases, two other CSPS with
similar characteristics were chosen.
The selection sample includes only women who gave
birth in health centres and had no complications, as the
study focused on expenses related to an institutional
birth.
In the full exemption districts (Dori and Sebba), the
study population was women who gave birth in health
centres two months prior to the start of the study. In the
partial exemption district (Djibo), the study population
was women who gave birth in health facilities in the six
months prior to the start of the study. This longer recall
period was needed to gather a large enough sample size
because the number of women using facility-based ser-
vices in that district was very low. At the CSPS level, the
sampling was done using maternal registers available in
each health centre. A random sample of approximately
50 women per health centre was selected from the regis-
ters. The survey size was limited to 50 per health centreTable 1 Districts characteristics (source: Plans d’Action 2010 d
Characteristics
Sebba
Government intervention (partial exemption In 2007) Yes
NGO HELP intervention (total exemption In 2008) Yes
Official cost of normal delivery to woman* 0 FCFA
Total population (2010) 179 819
Surface (km2) 6 591
Population below the poverty line (%) (2003) 52%
Main religion represented Islam
Main ethnicity represented Peulh
Facility-based delivery (%) (2008)** 47.2%
Facility-based delivery (%) (2009)** 77.8%
Facility-based delivery (%) (2010)** 91.2%
Facility-based delivery (%) (2011)** 96.6%
Health infrastructure (2010) 1 district hospital
11 CSPS
(*) The official cost of delivery corresponds to « acts, medicines and consumables, a
(**) Annuaire statistique 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 Ministère de la santé - Secrétariat g
NGO= Non government organization.
CSPS= Centre de santé et de protection sociale, i.e. “first line health centre”.
F CFA= Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine.
« facility-based delivery » refers to facility-based childbirths assisted by professional
called in French: Accouchements assistés par du personnel de santé.due to the limited financial resources available for the
study. In Dori and Sebba it was possible to achieve this
target. However, in Djibo, the low rate of facility-based
births (2010) together with an exceptional number of
emigrants made it more difficult to reach our targeted
sample size. Thus, the final sample in this district was
270 women rather than 300. The total sample was 870
women who gave birth in 18 health centres. Twenty-one
women were excluded from the original sample as they
were found to have given birth at home or before reach-
ing the health centre (see Table 2).
Survey instruments
Survey instruments were developed based on a similar
survey conducted in another district of Burkina Faso in
2006 by IMMPACT researchers and in 2010 by VR and
AB in Ouargaye [14]. The instruments measure medical
household expenditures related to institutional birth at
the point of use. The medical expenditures include: user
fees, drugs and consumables, laboratory fees, and clean-
ing products.
Traditional poverty measurements based on consump-
tion or incomes were particularly difficult in the sample
district settings. Instead, household characteristics and
asset ownership are widely used as indicators of wealth
[15]. Consequently, a series of questions related to the
specific characteristics of rural households in Burkina
Faso was used to gauge household economic status.
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18 CSPS 1 military clinic
1 district hospital 30 CSPS
1 military clinic 3 private health facilities
nd observation » (Ministère de la santé, 2006a).
énéral, Direction générale de l’information et des statistiques sanitaires.
s. According to the Annuaire Statistique where the indicator comes from, it is
Table 2 Sampling
Districts Sebba Dori Djibo Total
Government intervention (partial exemption) Yes Yes Yes -
NGO HELP intervention (total exemption) Yes Yes No -
Total deliveries (N) in 6 health centres1 687* 549* 391** 1627
Random sampling 299 301 270 870
Outliers (home delivery /on the way) 9 8 4 21
Total (n) deliveries selected 290 293 266 849
(1) Source: maternal registers available in health centres Period of delivery: *March 2010- May 2010; **December 2009- May 2010.
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Peulh, following the double-translation method. The
instruments were pretested in the Dori district in a CSPS
not included in the sample. The pre-test assessed the
validity of the data-collection instruments and proce-
dures, as well as the sampling procedures. This process
identified content and logistical issues that led to revis-
ing some of the questions and the data collection
process.
Data collection
Sahel Regional Authorities approved the survey. Field-
work was conducted over a five-week period starting in
May 2010 by six trained local interviewers fluent in
Peulh and French. Each interviewer interviewed +/− 50
women over a ten-day period. The household survey
questionnaires were administered to all study partici-
pants. Respondents gave verbal consent to the interview
and were assured of data confidentiality. Two research
coordinators carefully supervised data collection during
the entire fieldwork.
Data analysis
Data was input and validation was performed with the
double entry method using Epi Data software, and the
data set was then converted to SPSS 17 and STATA 11
for analysis. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was per-
formed to compute means of medical expenses and
compare them between districts and other explanatory
variables (education, distance, etc.).
A poverty proxy was developed using household data
indicators. Through Principal Components Analysis
(PCA), households/women were assigned to poverty
quintiles [16]. This allows a classification of households
from the poorest (rated as 1) to the least poor (rated as
5) in order to show socio-economic differences.
As we did not have information about household con-
sumption and/or income, it is not possible to measure
catastrophic expenditures related to births health cen-
tres. Instead, we relied upon the concept of "high deliv-
ery health care spending per household", equivalent to
“excessive spending per household”. It was estimated by
analyzing the expenditures dispersion within the twosamples (full exemption vs partial exemption group). By
using the statistical outlier method (or Tukey method) it
was possible to identify the value threshold. Supposing
Q1 and Q3 are respectively the first and third quartiles
of the distribution of delivery health expenditure of the
sample, then a high-spending or outlier household
within the group is one for which the value of delivery
health expenditure is greater than Q3+k*(Q3-Q1), where
k is a constant (varied from 0.5, 1 or 1.5). Having three
values for k, rather than one, allows more flexibility in
defining the outlier households at different expenditure
cut-off points and permits testing the sensitivity of the
results. In fact, the smaller k is, the stricter is the ap-
proach [17].
Ethics statement
The Ministry of Health of Burkina Faso examined and
approved the ethics component of this research project
and authorized the study. Ethical approval was given
prior to data collection.
Results
Sample characteristics
The socio-economic and demographic status of the sam-
ple households is presented in Table 3. The table shows
that social, economic, and demographic characteristics
are very similar within the three districts. The table
shows a difference in the variable “distance from home
to health facility”. In fact, women selected from Dori
and Djibo lived nearer the health centres than did study
subjects from Sebba. Despite this observed difference,
the sample characteristics are fundamentally comparable
(see Table 3).
Medical expenses distribution
The distribution of the medical expenditures is illu-
strated in Figure 1. This figure represents Box plot, a vis-
ual representation of both central tendency and
dispersion of the total medical expenses of the three
samples. It simultaneously shows the 25th, 50th (me-
dian), and 75th percentile scores, along with the mini-
mum and maximum scores. It is used to compare total
Table 3 Sample characteristics by districts
Variables Districts
Sebba Dori Djibo Total
% % % %
Age
15-24 53.8 55.3 56.8 55.2
25-34 35.5 35.8 36.8 36.0
35 and more 10.7 8.9 6.4 8.7
Ethnic group
Peulh 73.4 86.7 68.0 78.4
Gourmatché 22.4 0.7 0,4 8
Mossi 2.4 4.8 30.1 11.9
Other 1.4 1 1.5 1.3
Matrimonial status
Single 0 2 0 0.7
(Married) monogamous 82.1 82.3 77.8 80.8
(Married) polygamous 17.9 15.7 22.2 18.5
Education level
No school 81.4 84.0 91.4 85.4
Literacy 11.4 8.9 4.9 8.5
Primary school 5.9 4.4 2.6 4.4
Secondary and more 1.4 2.7 1.1 1.8
Parity
Primiparous 28.7 25.9 24.9 26.5
Multiparous (2 to 4) 71.3 75.4 77.5 74.6
High multiparous (5 and more) 0 21.1 12.1 11.1
Distance from home to health facility
Less than 5km 34.1 61.4 65.0 53.2
5-9 km 37.9 27.6 25.6 30.5
10 km and more 22.1 10.6 9.4 14.1
N/D 5.9 0.3 0 2.1
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three districts (see Figure 1).
The figure illustrates significant differences in medical
expenses distribution between the three groups. In fact,
medical expenses are lower and the distribution is
reduced for all the sample women in Sebba, where there
is a full exemption. However, in Dori, where there is a
full exemption as well, the box plot shows a large distri-
bution of medical expenses. In Djibo, the partial exemp-
tion district, the distribution of total medical expenses
appears systematically higher than the “fixed price” of
900 F CFA.
To complement the figure, Table 4 describes the med-
ical expenses distribution according to the type of ex-
penditure made by the households. In this context, it is
also essential to identify not only the amount but also the
nature of expenses at the point of use.
The table shows significant difference in the expenses
(median) between the three groups. The first line of userfees shows that in Djibo, women in the partial exemp-
tion district had to pay user fees, as expected. However,
a few women in Dori and Sebba testified to expenses
related to user fees for childbirth, while it should be free
for them. In addition, in the three districts, women spent
additional amounts on medicines and consumables while
all “procedures, drugs and consumables, and observa-
tion” are supposed to be included in the official user fee
[18]. In fact, a delivery kit includes all the drugs and
consumables used in a non-complicated birth at a pri-
mary health centre. This kit is part of the government
policy implementation plan. Dori seems to be the district
with a greater percentage of women paying for medi-
cines and consumables. There is a significant difference
of medical expenses between Dori and Sebba, even
though they both have the same intervention for full ex-
emption. Finally, the majority of the women had to pay
for cleaning products at the point of use. Neither the
NGO nor the government exemption included the cost
of cleaning products. In both cases, women had to pay
for cleaning products used to clean the delivery room
after use.
Excessive spending for households
To assess the impact of health expenditures burden
related to an institutional birth, households with exces-
sive health care costs were analysed. This indicator aims
to capture empirically the risk of impoverishment related
to childbirth and household medical care costs (see
Table 5).
At any given value of k, the prevalence of households
with excessive expenditures is much higher in the partial
exemption district (Djibo) compared to Sebba, the only
district with almost no excessive spending for house-
holds (1.1%; k=0,5). In addition, for two of the three k
values, there are no households with excessive expend-
iture in Sebba where deliveries are free of charge. On
the other hand, the comparison between Dori and Djibo
is quite unexpected. The percentage of households at
risk is very similar in the two districts, even if there are
fewer women with excessive expenditures in Dori than
Djibo. The comparison between the two districts with
the full exemption (Sebba and Dori) demonstrates that
Dori has many more households with excessive expendi-
tures than Sebba. Finally, we can observe that for Dori
and Djibo, the medical expenses cut-off level is higher
for higher values of k. At any given value of k relative
and absolute differences are about the same.
Socio-economic status of household at risk
After looking at the percentage of households with ex-
cessive spending in the two groups, table 6 demonstrates
the distribution of excessive spending across the socio
economic categories (Quintiles). This deeper analysis
Figure 1 Distribution of total medical delivery expenses in the three districts. Median, interquartile gap and extreme values.
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beneficial effect of the user fee related interventions on
the poorest and least poor of the region (see Table 6).
In the district of Sebba, the poorest seem to reap a
greater benefit from the total fee exemption than the less
poor. At any level of k, the prevalence of excessive
expenses is higher in Djibo and Dori than in Sebba. In
addition, the gap between the poor and the less poor
related to excessive spending is large in both Dori and
Djibo. Finally, we can observe that in the whole sample,
the less poor are more at risk of having excessive
expenses related to institutional childbirth than the
poorest quintile. This gap is more accentuated in Sebba
and Dori. This finding implies that the greater the
household capacity to pay, the more the household will
spend at the facility for medical charges. This last associ-
ation needs to be further explored in the field.Table 4 Detail of medical expenses distribution by district
Sebba (1)
N Median Q25 Q75 N
User fees for delivery 2 400 400 400 5
Medecine/
consummable fees (to health professional) 4 237.5 138 650 40
Medecine/
consummable fees (to pharmacist) 21 100 0 300 22
Cleaning product fees 205 200 200 200 240
Total medical expenses 282 150 0 300 275
1= Sebba, 2= Dori, 3= Djibo (*) Differences are considered to be significant when th
paid.Discussion
The pro-poor benefit of user fee exemption
There is extensive literature on the impact of abolishing
user fees on women’s use of health services. For instance,
a recent study analysed the effectiveness of the exemption
policy and the distribution of its benefits in Burkina Faso.
By reducing household expenses, all categories of the
population benefited from this policy, including the poor-
est. However, subsidizing medical costs did not reduce
inequalities in the way pregnant women used healthcare.
In fact, to improve service utilization by the poorest and
reduce expenses more significantly for women living far
from health centres, lowering healthcare costs is probably
not enough. There are still other financial and geographic
barriers to access that need to be removed to increase
institutional care for the poorest [14].
There is a consensus that removing or reducing finan-
cial barriers increases the number of institutional births.Dori (2) Djibo (3) P value (*)
Median Q25 Q75 N Median Q25 Q75 1vs 3 2vs3 1 vs 2
200 200 200 266 900 900 900 0.001 0.001 0.102
1500 925 1800 11 1000 600 2200 0.297 0.001 0.001
1000 800 1650 40 1815 1000 2250 0.014 0.419 0.004
196 150 300 240 150 100 300 0.679 0.016 0.002
200 150 700 266 1075 1000 1275 0.001 0.001 0.002
e P value is < 0.05. The median has been measured among the women that
Table 5 Prevalence of excessive spending within total and partial exemption districts
Threshold
(Djibo)
% of households with excessive spending
K value Sebba Djibo AD (%) RD (%) Dori Djibo AD (%) RD (%)
k=0.5 1413 1.1 22.5 20.3 100 17.5 22.5 2.8 13.8
k=1.0 1550 - 17.5 18 100 14.9 17.5 3.1 17.2
k=1.5 1688 - 12.0 17.7 100 13.1 12.0 4.6 26.0
Threshold
(Dori)
% of households with excessive spending
K value Sebba Dori AD (%) RD (%)
k=0.5 975 1.1 17.5 21.5 95.3
k=1.0 1250 - 14.9 17.5 -
k=1.5 1525 - 13.1 12.0 -
AD= absolute difference, RD= relative difference.
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poverishment in cases where fees have not been totally
abolished or where women have to pay other out-of
pocket costs at the point of use. Our study shows that
total exemption of user fees, such as in Sebba, can be
beneficial in reducing excessive expenses for women
using delivery care. However, when the additional sub-
sidy was not applied correctly, such as in Dori, house-
hold expenditure for direct delivery care costs did not
change significantly compared to health centres with
only partial exemption. In the Sebba district, where full
exemption of user fees was applied, reduction of exces-
sive health expenses was more significant in poor quin-
tiles. It can be argued that, in case of total exemption,
the positive impact on poor households would be signifi-
cant and would contribute to greater equity between the
poorest and the richest.
Similar to Ghana’s experience, the elimination of user
fees in two of Burkina Faso’s districts benefitted preg-
nant women regardless of their socio-economic status.
Ghana has introduced a similar exemption policy direc-
ted at making delivery care free. Findings showed thatTable 6 Prevalence of excessive spending by district and
quintile
Groups Sebba Dori Djibo
K=0.5 Q1 (poorest) 1.6 18.2 15.9
Q5 (least poor) 14.5 18.8 20
Q5-Q1 13.0 0.6 4.1
Q5/Q1 9.2 1.0 1.3
K=1.0 Q1 0.0 14.5 15.9
Q5 10.9 18.8 18.8
Q5-Q1 10.9 4.2 2.9
Q5/Q1 1.2
K=1.5 Q1 0.0 10.9 13.6
Q5 0.0 18.8 15.0
Q5-Q1 0 7.8 1.4
Q5/Q1 - 1.7 1.1with its universal application, the policy of abolishing
user fees also benefited the poor, thereby addressing the
equity issue in their health system. In fact, 18 months
after user fees were abolished the greatest increase in
health facility use was by the poorest segment of the
population [18].
This positive impact of the abolition of user fees on
the health care seeking behaviour and on the out-of-
pocket expenditures observed in Ghana should encour-
age Burkina Faso’s Government to expand the full ex-
emption pilot project to the national level.
In a country where almost 46% of the population lives
below the threshold of absolute poverty [8], it is import-
ant to implement poverty reduction strategies. Full user
fee exemptions could improve access to institutional
birthing facilities and reduce poverty by decreasing ex-
cessive medical expenses. In fact, we already observed
that access to facility-based delivery improves dramatic-
ally with the reduction of user fees. In three years, insti-
tutional deliveries increased by 35 to 50 percentage
point in Sebba and Dori and only by 14 percentage point
in the control district (Djibo) (see Table 4). Scaling up
the full user fee exemption to the national level would
certainly broaden its impact.
Implementation gap
Results in the three districts show inadequate implemen-
tation of the user-fee exemption, especially for Dori and
Djibo. In fact, respectively 21% and 19% of the women
are still paying for drugs and consumables, which should
be covered under both the government’s and NGO’s
exemptions program. During the household surveys,
women reported that they were still paying for items
that should be free, such as gloves, syringes and drugs.
In addition, in Dori, women are still facing out-of-pocket
expenses whereas all the births are supposed to be “free”
to the user. When these results were shared in a work-
shop with different stakeholders in November 2010,
health professionals from the region gave some explana-
tions for the added expenses. The main one arising from
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sion regarding both exemption programs [19]. In cases
where the nurses and midwives were unclear about the
procedures and products included in the subsidies, the
patient would end up paying. A second explanation sug-
gested by the staff for the cost of drugs and consumables
charged to users was a shortage of products in the
health centre pharmacy. In some remote health centres,
the pharmacy management was seen as a major chal-
lenge, forcing the women to buy the required products
for the non-complicated delivery from a private phar-
macy. The hypothesis given by health workers about a
shortage of products needs to be verified with more
qualitative research. However, a similar study in another
district (Ouargaye), demonstrated that supply shortages
in health centre pharmacies were very rarely involved in
the additional expenses incurred by the women. Occa-
sionally, because of the absence of the community phar-
macy manager, health workers send patients to a private
pharmacy in the village. The study, conducted in a single
district, confirmed, measured, and explained why the flat
fee was not respected when the policy was implemented.
Because this situation has been shown to exist in other
districts of the country, it is reasonable to believe that it
is a national problem.
The role of drug supply shortages was not really con-
firmed. However, the combination of three factors: i)
products not included in the delivery kit, ii) lack of
understanding of the exemption policy and iii) informal
charges by health workers; explains part of the imple-
mentation gap of the policy at the local level. Nonethe-
less, more qualitative research is needed to understand
all the plausible causes of this gap [20].
Information about the specific components of the ex-
emption policy remains fragmented and uncertain.
These problems of implementation and policy under-
standing are confirmed in two other studies in Burkina
Faso [21]. In Nouna and Ouargaye, two regions where
the national exemption policy has been evaluated re-
cently, the level of medical expenses is very similar to
those in the partial exemption district of this study,
Djibo [22]. The medical expenses are usually higher than
the designated user fees (900 F CFA), such as in Djibo
where 50% of women (median) declared paying more
than 1075 F CFA. The policy implementation gap
appears to have more severe consequences in Dori and
Djibo because the amount paid is much more than the
one in Sebba. It represents at least 4 days of earnings for
those who are living below the poverty line (46% of the
population). This difference between Sebba and Dori
could be explained by the fact that Sebba has a Chief
Medical Officer with better leadership to implement an
effective monitoring and control system to more effect-
ively implement the total exemption policy. A study inBurkina Faso shows how the leadership of the District
Chief Medical Officer (DCMO) could affect the per-
formance of the District [23]. This seems to be the case
in Dori and Sebba. For example, in 2010 the DCMO of
Sebba was able to find a scholarship to obtain a master’s
degree and in 2012 the DCMO of Dori was transferred
by the administration, reflecting that all health indicators
are worse in Dori than Sebba over the last five years (see
Table 4). However, further qualitative studies must be
done to understand in depth this difference between the
two districts. For example, it is crucial to analyse how
the NGO monitoring and evaluation system responded
to the different leadership in both districts. Finally, the
results show that the policy instrument of the abolition
of user fees is not enough; the implementation process
as well as a thorough monitoring system to reduce the
risk of implementation gap are essential [24, 25].
In addition, in Burkina Faso, the fixed-rate reimburse-
ment of services represents a profound change to health
administration practices, designed to reduce the work
burden of health professionals. However, the administra-
tion in general in Burkina Faso is more bureaucratic and
demands detailed proof for every health service deliv-
ered, even with a fixed-rate reimbursement system. This
lack of alignment resulted in fixed-rate reimbursement
under an actual-cost accounting system. Thus, one im-
portant weakness is that the accounting control system
is not set up for fixed-rate reimbursement, and discus-
sions are on-going to return to a system based on real
expenses, as the actual costs for births are less than the
fixed-rate reimbursement. Thus, the implementation gap
can also be explained by this administrative conflict be-
tween practice and accountability. In fact, health profes-
sionals have a financial interest in reducing the real
amount of used input to make a profit on the fixed-rate
received for the service. Furthermore, despite relatively
tight administrative controls, it seems that health work-
ers have figured out how to take advantage of the system
[23,26]. It demonstrates once again the necessity to re-
view policy instruments to improve its effectiveness.
The process of policy development and implementa-
tion has itself an important influence on effective imple-
mentation. In fact, the potential for a “no user fee” policy
to translate into reduced mortality and morbidity for
mothers and babies depends fundamentally on the effect-
iveness of its implementation. The NGO implemented a
system of monitoring and control of the exemption sys-
tem in all the health centres in Dori and Sebba. They also
supported health centres in running and maintaining
their facilities, by building the capacity of the healthcare
and administrative staff as well as community health
management committees. The NGO also initiated activ-
ities to raise community awareness of maternal health-
related issues. They use a reimbursement form based on
Ameur et al. BMC Health Services Research 2012, 12:412 Page 9 of 10
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/412lump sum per delivery that coincides with a flat rate of
900 F CFA. However, findings demonstrate that there is a
need for a strong monitoring and evaluation component
to address problems related to partial and full policy im-
plementation at the local and national levels, including
effective and thorough dissemination of the policies to
the communities and health workers [26].
Strengths and limitations
The adequacy of the study design and the degree of con-
trol exercised in the data gathering enhanced the in-
ternal validity. The random assignment of the sample
and the control of external variables within the districts
ensured the analysis of the change in the dependent
variable (household expenses). In addition, at any given
value of k, findings show the same type of association
between the percentage of households with excessive
spending and the group affiliation. This homogeneity
enhances the reliability of the findings.
One limitation of this study is the potential for recall
or memory bias. These measure biases can occur while
collecting information about the extent and types of out-
of-pocket expenditures by women/households for non-
complicated institutional birthing services in the selected
health centres. In order to reduce this type of systematic
error regarding childbirth expenditures, researchers
attempted to limit the period between interviews (May
2010) and time of birth to a maximum of 2 months.
However, in cases where total number of deliveries dur-
ing this period was not sufficient (< 50 women) the
period of selection was extended up to 6 months prior
to May 2010. This date extension was made only for the
comparison district sample.
Another limitation is the lack of data in the districts of
Dori and Sebba before the HELP intervention in 2008.
In fact, we do not possess the information about the
household expenses related to institutional delivery prior
to the HELP pilot. Such data would have increased the
internal validity of the study. Thus, in a context of nat-
ural experimentation, the case–control design is the best
design to conduct such study.
The partial exemption district also had some limitation
when it comes to analysing the istricts characteristics
(Table 4). However, choices of districts for comparison
were very limited. Therefore, there are challenges to the
evaluation of public health policy interventions as nat-
ural experiments because of the lack of control over the
study conditions [11]. To reduce this challenge as much
as possible, Djibo, which has characteristics most like to
Dori and Sebba, was chosen for the study.
Conclusions
The results of this study are particularly encouraging.
They show that the abolition of payment for facility-based births is a solution that is not only equitable, but
also potentially useful in reducing the proportion of
women for whom excessive medical expenses represent
a serious risk to their household well-being. However,
the implementation gap in Dori is a lesson to keep im-
proving the monitoring system related to medical
expenses at the point of use. Furthermore, additional re-
search is needed to understand factors associated with
the “success” of total exemption intervention in Sebba.
For example, the leadership of the District Medical Offi-
cer must be studied as well as positive and negative
incentives that may be used to allow effective application
of the exemption at health centre level.
During the study, the government’s partial exemption
was based on fixed-rate reimbursement (lump sum flat
fee). However, for uncomplicated births, the fixed rate
costs were never compared to actual costs of care deliv-
ery. The government set the cost for an uncomplicated
birth at 4500 F CFA. This included the cost of the deliv-
ery kit (drugs and consumables). Women thus have to
pay 900 F CFA for uncomplicated births (20%). These
expenses were supposed to be included in the national
budget for the period 2006–2015, evidence of a real pol-
itical commitment to reducing maternal mortality and
morbidity. However, many studies demonstrated that the
fixed rate fee structure is higher than the real cost of un-
complicated births (gap of −17 to −27 between 2006 and
2008). Consequently, abolishing the 900 FCFA payment
as promised by the Head of State in February 2010
appears feasible, as long as mechanisms are in place to
eliminate informal charges. Indeed, the district of Kaya
abolished the 900 FCFA payment without any NGO as-
sistance by using its decentralized credits mechanisms.
Furthermore, since 2011 in Djibo and 2012 in Gorum-
Gorum the local municipalities have paid the 900 F CFA
user fees, showing that political will At local level can re-
duce financial barriers. Full exemption for all from
point-of-service user fees should be considered in order
to move toward universal coverage [27, 28]. The Presi-
dent of Burkina Faso is therefore accurate when he sta-
ted in 2010 that he would embark on completely
removing the direct payment for facility-based births.
This decision has yet to be implemented, while this
study shows how it would be beneficial to women.
Therefore, it is now urgent to abolish user fees for births
because the State has the financial means to do so. Fur-
thermore, international donors should also reorient their
interest on achieving universal health coverage by sup-
porting government implementing total abolition of user
fees as an effective strategy toward equity and poverty
reduction in developing countries. At the same time, the
State must find ways to ensure effective implementation
of its policies by making sure that they are clearly under-
stood and by establishing accountability mechanisms. In
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strument of the abolition of user fees is not enough; the
implementation process is essential and needs a thorough
monitoring system to reduce the risk of implementation
gaps [11].
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